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ARGUMENT
I.

RESPONSE TO GREAT AMERICAN'S STATEMENT OF FACTS.
One would expect the Appellee, Great American E&S Insurance Company ("Great

American") to recite as the relevant "facts," those discrete undisputed material facts
offered below in Great American's cross motion for summary judgment. Instead, Great
American has offered a "new" statement of facts that includes "facts" without record
citations; facts citing deposition testimony for which there is no foundation; facts that are
correct in part and embellished in part; and in a few critical instances plain misstatements.
Unfortunately, this approach is not new, since Great American has attempted to change
the record regarding its summary judgment motion at every opportunity.1
Great American's approach makes it difficult to determine what facts Great
American actually considers to be material and without dispute. Nevertheless, Peters2
must clarify that the record does not remotely support the claims: (1) that SOS Staffing,
]

The facts are dealt with below in the following briefs: Great American's original
statement of facts (R 16-20) is responded to in Knutesons1 opposition (R 841-845).
Knutesons also offered a statement of undisputed facts (R 809-17) in opposition to Great
American's motion and in support of its own motion. These are admitted by Great
American. R 1039. Great American nevertheless sought to introduce new affidavits and
a new statement of facts on reply. R 933-68. Knutesons responded, pointing out that
these additional facts are irrelevant and far from undisputed. R 1066-71, 1076-80. Great
American then offered a supplemental brief wherein it argued about what subsequent
depositions and documentary evidence demonstrated (R 1712-35) and the trial court
required simultaneous briefs so no direct response was allowed. Nevertheless, Knutesons
offered a detailed statement of supported facts. R 1405-14.
2

Peters and Knutesons have taken the same position throughout these proceedings
and reference to Peters1 position is that of Knutesons as well.
1

Inc. ("SOS") did not desire or obtain automobile liability insurance for any of its
employees supervised by clients; (2) that Federal provided automobile coverage to SOS's
clients on an individual basis based upon payment for such insurance rather than under
the same policy language that applies to Vicars Trucking Company, Inc. ("Vicars") and to
Peters; and (3) that SOS communicated and Federal agreed with SOS's claimed use of the
words "staff and "temporary employee." The actual facts are to the contrary*
A.

SOS Sought Insurance for Some Employees Supervised by Clients.

Great American's principle premise is that SOS desired for all of its employees
supervised by clients to be excluded for both primary and secondary automobile insurance
regardless of whether the employee worked as a "temp" on short-term assignment or was
a leased employee hired on a permanent basis. Great American takes this position
because if a single employee supervised by clients is covered, then "staff potentially
embraces Peters because he was in no way a "temp." The facts easily disprove Great
American's premise.
L

SOS Was Contractually Obligated to Provide Automobile Insurance.

As a starting point, SOS admittedly paid a premium for secondary non-owned
automobile coverage based upon 10,000 employees, which includes all employees
working for clients. See Appellants' Brief, Statement of Facts ("SOF") at 13 (ffi[ 35-36).
The original affidavit of SOS's general counsel, John Morrison, concedes coverage was
provided to "[ejmployees working for SOS clients" when requested. R 999 (Affidavit at

2

f 7). Morrison again confirmed in testimony that non-owned automobile liability
coverage was extended to some employees supervised by clients and to those clients.
R 1491 (Morrison Depo at 26). SOS was contractually bound in numerous contracts to
provide such insurance. R 1514-15 (Invitrogen); R 1525 (Bergen Brunswig); R 1556
(Hewlett Packard); see also R 1570 (Invitrogen); R 1573 (Bergen Brunswig); R 1574
(Chimes and Hewlett-Packard); R 1575 (same); R 1579 (American Fence and Security);
R 1580 (GE Capital); R 1581 (Questar); R 1606 (Alcoa); R 1585 (same); R 1606
(Burlington Resource); R 1633 (Questar). Clients also demanded that SOS's automobile
insurer agree to waive its subrogation rights. See R 105 (Handley Depo at 105) ("it's an
ongoing issue as far back as I can remember"); see also R 1457 (Marshall Depo at 40).
2.

SOS Reduced its Primary Risk.

SOS's approach was not to eliminate automobile coverage but to do three things to
reduce its primary automobile insurance risk. First, SOS applied for and sought
insurance. See SOF at 13flflf35-36). Second, SOS apparently sought to reduce the
number of claims by foregoing coverage for "temps" on short-term assignment. The
words used are "temporary employees for the customers." R 682. Third, SOS sought to
reduce the level of risk for the remaining covered employees supervised by clients by
relying upon the clients' primary insurance. The broker suggested that because SOS's
automobile insurance is secondary, SOS could require that the clients and the involved

3

employees maintain sufficiently high limits so that SOS's coverage would not generally
respond. See R 1700-01; R 1435-36 (Handley Depo at 52-53).
3.

The Same Unmodified Policy Language Applies to All Clients.

Most significantly, for purposes of this appeal, the record is undisputed that in
providing automobile insurance for employees supervised by clients, the same policy
language applies to all of SOS's clients and employees. Great American's statement that
individual SOS clients ffpay[]ff for this insurance is patently false. See GA Brief at 7.
Rather, Federal communicated to SOS that it would never issue an endorsement adding a
particular SOS client as an "additional insured" for automobile coverage and that "[n]o
such endorsement exists." R 1431 (Handley Depo at 24). The agent reported these facts
to SOS. R 1431, 1435-36, 1451 (Handley Depo at 24, 51-54, 144); R 1697-1702 (emails); R 1462-67 (Marshall Depo at 61-62, 68, 72-74, 76, 80-81); R 1498-1500, 1502-03
(Morrison Depo at 72, 76-77, 86-89). Consequently, SOS's clients from Vicars to
Hewlett Packard are treated the same because the Federal Policy is an integrated contract:
This policy's terms can be amended or waived only by endorsement
issued by us and made a part of this policy.
R 667 (f B) (emphasis in original). The SOS witnesses concede that Federal issued no
endorsements adding SOS's clients or the involved employees as "additional insureds."
R 1431, 1436, 1451 (Handley Depo at 24, 53-54, 144); R 1456-59, 1463, 1475 (Marshall
Depo at 36-37, 41, 47, 67-68, 115); R 1492, 1500, 1502 (Morrison Depo at 30, 78, 87).

4

Nevertheless, Federal communicated to SOS the "opinion that [Federal] did not
need to grant... to our clients additional insured status because they felt they were
already included in the wording . . . in the policy." R 1462 (Marshall Depo at 62); see
also R 1500 (Morrison Depo at 77); R 1432-33 (Handley Depo at 36-38). Federal's
opinion is set forth in an e-mail from Federal's underwriter stating:
Under the Who is an insured section of the policy, paragraph C
extends coverage to "Anyone else who is not otherwise excluded
under paragraph b. above and is liable for the conduct of an
"insured" but only to the extent of that liability".
R 1698. Under this language, the SOS client is an "insured" to the extent it is responsible
for the conduct of another "insured," the covered SOS "staff employees. See R 1465
(Marshall Depo at 73-74) (if the SOS employee is an "insured" then the client could be an
insured for the employee's conduct); see also R 1503, 1510 (Morrison Depo at 91, 15354) (SOS's client "likely . .. could be held vicariously liable for activities of an SOS
employee"). Admittedly, this contract language "appl[ies] to any of SOS's clients."
R 1451 (Handley Depo at 143) (emphasis added).
4,

SOS Confirmed Coverage for Employees Supervised by Clients.

Without obtaining "additional insureds" endorsements, SOS issued "Certificates(s)
of Liability Insurance" confirming coverage for automobile liability including excess
liability coverage under the Great American Policy. See R 1569-81.3 With respect to

3

Great American is sometimes referred to in these certificates by its prior name,
(continued...)
5

Hewlett Packard ("H.P."), for example, SOS supplied its client with full-time computer
programmers. R 1496 (Morrison Depo at 49). Under the contract with H.P., non-owned
automobile liability insurance was required for both H.P. and for the individual
employees. R 1496 (Morrison Depo at 51). In meeting this contractual obligation, SOS
represented to PI.P. that coverage was provided under the Federal Policy "but only as
respects to work performed by the named insured's employees." R 1574 (Certificate). In
other words, H.P. was covered only because the SOS employee who did full-time work is
an "insured." See R 1698 (underwriter's e-mail). In describing whether SOS relied upon
the language quoted by Federal's underwriter to provide this assurance to clients, SOS's
insurance broker testified: "Yes. We had to." R 1434 (Handley Depo at 42).
In short, the record demonstrates without dispute that some SOS employees
supervised by clients, including for example full-time programmers supplied to H.P.,
were covered "staff and not excluded "temporary employees."

3

(...continued)
"Agricultural Express & Surplus." The certificates are not endorsements and do not
modify the policies. The certificates expressly state: "THIS CERTIFICATE IS ISSUED
AS A MATTER OF INFORMATION ONLY. . .. [IT] DOES NOT AMEND, EXTEND
OR ALTER THE COVERAGE." Id. (emphasis added). The broker concedes he did
not have authority to bind, Federal R 1427 (Handley Depo at 6), the certificates have a
stamp signature for SOS's agent (not Federal's signature), and they were not as a matter of
routine practice provided to Federal. R 1445 (Id. at 117). Providing the certificate to
Federal was a "judgment call" and Handley has no information that any of SOS's
certificates were provided. R 1445 (Id. at 117-18).
6

B.

SOS Never Communicated to Federal Any Special Meaning for the
Words Used in Endorsement 16-02-33.

Faced with the admitted fact that SOS's post-claim reading of the words "stafff
and ''temporary employees for the customers" is contrary to the ordinary meaning of the
words used (R 1478 (Marshall Depo at 126); R 1509 (Morrison Depo at 149-50)), Great
American nevertheless argues that SOS communicated to Federal a unique understanding
of these words. See GA Brief at 23. Afraid of the spotlight, Great American makes this
factual claim in footnote at 23, n.5 with citations that are not remotely supportive.4
The testimony of the three SOS witnesses disproves Great American's factual
claim. SOS's general counsel, John Morrison, was present for no discussions with
Federal (R 1489, 1501 (Morrison Depo at 19, 83)), he did not draft any policy language
(R 1490 (id. at 23)) and Morrison "can't give us a personal statement as to how that
particular language [endorsement 16-02-33] made it onto this endorsement." R 1507 (id.
at 133). Likewise, SOS's risk manager, Mark Marshall, recalls no discussions with
Federal (R 1455, 1470 (Marshall Depo at 22, 93)), he does not know "what Steve
Handley did or did not say to anyone at Federal with respect to [16-02-33]" (R 1470,

4

The cited testimony reveals that the insurance broker can't recall when the
involved endorsement came into existence, he can't recall "how it came into existence"
and he doesn't know if he talked to SOS at the time of the Federal Policy. R 1440-41
(Handley Depo at 84-85). The absence of any communication with Federal on the key
language is detailed below. Great American also cites deposition testimony of Mark
Marshall that might be misleading. Great American quotes Marshall regarding what was
communicated to "them," making it appear he communicated with Federal, without
noting that Mr. Marshall has no idea what was stated to Federal as described below.
7

1486-87 (id. at 94, 219-20) and he is not aware of any communication where SOS told
Federal "it meant for the word temporary to mean permanent." R 1486 (id. at 217).
With respect to SOS's broker, Steve Handley, his recollection is extremely limited.
He does not recall who the underwriter at Federal was or when he may have spoken with
him. See R 1109 (Affidavit at f 13); see also R 1428, 1430, 1440-41, 1450 (Handley
Depo at 11-12, 17, 84-85, 137). Handley only recalls asking for an endorsement that
would make "the 'Employees As Insureds' endorsement (CA 989) apply to the staff
employees of SOS and not temporary employees." R 1109 (Affidavit at ^ 13). Handley
has no recollection of any discussion "regarding the words 'staff employee' or 'temporary
employee.'" Id.; see also R 1428-29 (Handley Depo at 12-13, 15-16). Moreover, when
Great American's counsel asked Handley whether SOS intended for SOS's payrollers
(including full-time employees like Peters) to be considered part of SOS's covered "staff,"
or part of the uncovered "temporary employees," he responded:
THE WITNESS: I would not know how to answer that question.
R 1453 (Handley Depo at 154) (emphasis added). In short, there is no evidence that
SOS's alleged secret intent was communicated to Federal.
Lastly, the evidence from Federal is uniformly supportive of coverage. Federal
told SOS that without making policy modifications SOS could satisfy certain client
demands for automobile coverage by citing the policy language that the SOS employees
working for the clients are "insureds" and therefore the clients are likewise covered for

8

the conduct of these employees. R 1698. Federal also recognized coverage for Peters
specifically before coverage litigation was pursued. See R 744-45 (letter confirming
coverage). Federal recognized coverage despite SOS's protests that such finding could
impact its future rates (R 1504, 1506, 1508 (Morrison Depo at 94, 105, 146)); R 1439
(Handley Depo at 66-67)), and despite Great American's protests. See GA Brief at 32.5
II.

THE GREAT AMERICAN POLICY COVERS ALL SOS'S EMPLOYEES.
With the above clarification of the factual record, Peters turns to the legal

arguments presented regarding the Great American Policy. Great American has denied
coverage by seeking to incorporate by reference two endorsements to the Federal Policy.

5

Great American's citation to materials given to Vicars also requires a brief
response because the offered statements lack context. Vicars signed two documents, R 85
("Nonliability Statement") and R 439 ("Vehicle Statement"). The documents were signed
in connection with SOS's Ogden office possibly providing short-term temporaries to
Vicars. See R 786-93 (Alayne Vicars Depo at 7,12, 14-15, 18-20, 26-27, 32-33 and 46);
R 795-96 (John Vicars Depo at 39-43). The Logan office of SOS was not involved and it
is that office which provided employee leasing services for full-time employees like
Peters. Id. In the end, no short-term temporaries were ever provided to Vicars. Id. The
two SOS documents are also irreconcilably in conflict. The Nonliability Statement states
"employees placed by SOS are not otherwise covered by employers liability and/or
general liability insurance." See R 85. The Vehicle Statement states the opposite: "SOS
employees are covered by Workers' Compensation, employers' liability and general
liability policies. Certificates of Insurance will be furnished upon request." See R 439.
The Federal Policy is a type of general liability policy. To the extent the Vehicle
Statement explains that there is an exception for certain vehicles, that exception is a
limited one: "[i]t is not practical for us to insure vehicles or machinery/equipment only
temporarily used by our employees at your request." See R 439 (emphasis added). Most
importantly, SOS's desire to secure secondary automobile insurance for employees in the
field is undisputed. See Appellants' Brief at 13 (SOFffi[35-36); see also R 1700-01
(memo from broker to SOS).
9

Great American then attempts to ignore Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-106(1) which
prohibits incorporation by arguing that the statute is permissive and has been applied only
"where an insured would need to have separate knowledge of the law in order to
understand what its policy covers." GA Brief at 38-39. Great American then claims that
if the statute is applied to excess or umbrella policies such policies "could not be written
in Utah as a practical matter." Id. These arguments are irrelevant and wrong.
"It is . . . well established that f[t]he form of the verb used in a statute, i.e.,
something 'may,' 'shall' or 'must' be done, is the single most important textual
consideration determining whether a statute is mandatory or directory.'" State ex re. M.C.
v. K.H.C., 940 P.2d 1229, 1236 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (quoting 3 Norman J. Singer,
Sutherland Statutory Construction § 57.03, at 7 (5th ed. 1992)). Here the Utah legislature
has stated that an insurance policy "may not" incorporate by reference any term. Since
the word "may" is permissive, it follows that the opposite, "may not,"is mandatory. Id.;
see also GA Brief at 38 (policy "cannot 'incorporate.'"). This Court has already rejected
the argument that the statute is permissive and will not be enforced if its "purpose" is not
violated, for example, when an insurance policy incorporates information presumably
known through public statutes. Cullum v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 857 P.2d 922, 925 (Utah
1993). This Court held "[t]he language of the statute does not lend itself to such an
interpretation." Id.

10

Further, requiring an excess or umbrella carrier to attach those portions of an
underlying policy intended to be included does not render such insurance "impractical,"
rather it presents an easy and statutorily mandated way to ensure that the policy reveals its
precise language. The Great American Policy is a perfect example of how clarity could
easily have been achieved but instead ambiguity was created.
The language Great American cites is unclear on whether incorporation is to take
place at all and, if so, to what extent. Great American argues that paragraph "F.6"
incorporates Federal endorsements CA 989 and 16-02-33 based upon the phrase "for no
broader coverage" and alleged "context." See GA Brief at 33-36. In reality, the context
of paragraph "F.6" refutes the claim that any language dealing with "who is an
insured" is incorporated. The Great American Policy devotes nine separate
subparagraphs and over 500 words to defining the covered "insured[s].H R 704 (f F).
The Federal Policy deals with these same subjects on its own precise terms. See R 655
fl[A.l).
Most importantly, the Great American Policy contains its own definition of the
"employees" who are insureds. R 704 (f F.6). The Federal Policy likewise contains its
own definition of the covered "employees." R 662flfflE and H), R 663 fl[ N), R 681 (CA
989) and R 682 (16-02-33). While Great American apparently does not argue that all 500
plus words defining the covered "insureds" are displaced by language from the Federal
Policy, it implicitly argues that 68 words used to define the covered "employees" are

11

eliminated. GA Brief at 34 ("the analysis runs back into the clear language of the second
endorsement of the Federal policy."). In context, this argument is absurd. Great
American fails to explain how it can pick and choose language on the subject of "who are
the insureds," while other similar language is not incorporated.
The structure off F.6 also contradicts Great American's interpretation. Paragraph
F.6 contains subparagraphs that deal, in order, with three subjects: (1) that employees are
insureds while acting within the scope of employment; (2) that automobile coverage must
be provided in the underlying insurance; and (3) who are and are not the covered
employees. R 704 (f F.6). In context, the reference to no broader "coverage" in the
second subparagraph is not an attempt to define the covered "employees." If it were,
Great American would not have provided its own definition of the covered "employees"
in the following subparagraph. Id.
Incorporation "must be sufficiently clear for [the] court to conclude the parties
intended the incorporation." Schneider Nafl Transport v. Ford Motor Co., 280 F.3d 532,
538 (5th Cir. 2002). Peters previously cited many cases which have held that a reference
to "coverage" in umbrella policies does not embrace the list of insureds or other limiting
language but instead merely requires that underlying insurance be provided. See
Appellants' Brief at 23-25. Great American dismisses these cases without analysis, yet

12

Great American does not cite a single case supportive of its position that the
reference to "no broader coverage" redefines the "insureds." See GA Brief at 34-35.6
Finally, Great American's claim that Peters relies upon incorporation by reference
as a primary argument is incorrect. Paragraph F.6 imposes a condition that underlying
automobile insurance be provided and that condition is admittedly met. R 756 (Great
American's counsel); R 1855 at 5-6 (same). Further, once that condition is met, this Court
can enforce the Great American Policy without imposing additional limitations contained
in endorsements that violate Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-106(1). See Appellants' Brief at
26-27 (citing this Court's prior case law and § 31A-21-107(1) to the effect that a noncomplying policy may be enforced by the policyholder). Great American has not
responded on this key point and its position that coverage fails entirely is clearly wrong
under past cases and the Insurance Code. Id.
Alternatively, this Court can simply read the "no broader coverage" language and
find that at most Federal's more limited insuring clause is incorporated and the Great
American Policy can be enforced as written. See Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-107(1).

6

This Court's recent analysis in Benjamin v. Arnica Mut Ins. Co., 2006 UT 37,
% 35, 140 P.3d 1210, 1217, lends contextual support to the interpretation that Great
American intended for the "no broader coverage" language to refer, at most, to the scope
of the insuring clause for automobiles, not to redefine the "insureds." In Benjamin, this
Court acknowledged that in general "[ujmbrella policies widen the scope of coverage."
That is the case here under the insuring clauses. See Appellants' Brief at 25, n.7.
Consequently, the "for no broader coverage" language serves to overcome the general
rule of broader insurance for the limited purpose of the automobile insuring clause.
13

III.

COVERAGE EXISTS IF THE GREAT AMERICAN POLICY IS
"FOLLOW FORM" AND THE LANGUAGE OF ENDORSEMENT 16-0233 IS INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE.
If this Court disagrees with the above analysis of the Great American Policy and

finds it necessary to address endorsement 16-02-33, Peters is nevertheless covered by the
Federal Policy. Great American's brief is revealing regarding a key issue it chooses not to
address. Specifically, Great American does not analyze endorsement 16-02-33 under
plain meaning. Instead, Great American sets up the false premise that SOS intended to
obtain an exclusion for every one of its employees supervised by clients and Great
American argues SOS communicated to Federal an intent to use the words in 16-02-33
according to a special meaning. As detailed in Peters' original Statement of Facts
(Appellants' Brief at 9-13 ff 20-36) and supra Section I, these assertions are incorrect as
a matter of undisputed fact. SOS never intended for all its employees supervised by
clients to be excluded, particularly for secondary coverage above the clients' insurance.
Tragically, it is undisputed that Mary Lynn Knuteson's injuries exceed the limits of all
underlying insurance, including the Vicars and Federal policies.
More importantly, SOS's uncommunicated intent is irrelevant. See 17A Am.Jur.2d
Contracts § 348 ("the intention of the parties must be gathered from that language, and
from that language alone, no matter what the actual or secret intentions of the parties may
have been); see also Appellants' Brief at 41-43 (additional authority). At one time, Great
American conceded this point. R 1719 ("Great American does n o t . . . suggest that SOS's
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understanding of the definitions of the terms 'staff and 'temporary employee' is relevant to
the construction of the insurance contract."). Unfortunately, Great American has not
abided by this concession on appeal. See GA Brief at 17-32.
When the words used are given plain meaning, coverage is clearly provided. In
trying to avoid reading the key language ("staff of the insured only and not temporary
employees for the customers") according to plain meaning, Great American sets up a
strawman. Great American argues that Peters has attempted to make endorsement 16-0233 "useless[j" (GA Brief at 19), "ignored [it] altogether" (id.\ "disregarded [it]" {id.), and
that the interpretation offered by Peters "would cause every SOS employee to be"
covered. M a t 27-28. This parade of horribles is unfounded.
SOS has two core businesses: supplying "temps" and "employee leasing." See
R 1112 (insurance application). While Great American accuses Peters of "concocting" a
third category of SOS employee (see GA Brief at 5), so-called "payrollers," it is SOS that
has consistently characterized Peters as a "payroller" (see R 1010 (Marshall Affidavit at
1f 5); R 1504 (Morrison Depo at 96); R 1086 (contemporaneous November 2001 letter).
SOS also concedes payrollers are treated differently from both "temporary employees"
who work for clients and other employees who work in SOS's offices.7

7

As compared to "temporary employees," payrollers are paid on a different pay
scale, payrollers do not receive a 40IK company match and payrollers' vacation benefits
differ. R 1504-05 (Morrison Depo at 96-97); R 1478-79 (Marshall Depo at 128-29).
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Within this admitted context, Peters does not dispute that many, perhaps most, of
SOS's employees are excluded because most are "temporary employees for the
customers." However, some employees are not, including those who work in SOS's
physical offices and others such as the full-time computer programmers assigned to H.P.
See supra 5-6. Once the strawman is removed, the position of Peters is elementary.
Peters' position is simply that the words "and not temporary employees for
the customers" cannot be magically transformed into the words "and not [all]
employees who work directly for customers at their place of work" as Great
American argues. See GA Brief at 19-20. In seeking reformation, Great American asks
this Court to do six things it cannot do: (1) throw away dictionaries and existing rules for
contract construction, including reading the word "temporary" out of the contract;
(2) disregard Federal's definition of a "temporary worker" in the same policy as
embracing a temporal component; (3) disregard SOS's public use of the word "staff in
favor of an undisclosed subjective meaning; (4) disregard Federal's finding of coverage
and payment of the claim; (5) disregard SOS's representations and warranties to clients
that some employees working at a customer's location are covered; and (6) disregard the
admissions of Great American's coverage counsel and adjustor.
With respect to the critical rules of contract interpretation, it is apparent that Great
American is seeking to have this Court apply a specialized, technical, subjective meaning.
See GA Brief at 23-25. However, in Utah, the standards for construing insurance
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contracts are well established and so long as the language is unambiguous (as Great
American contends), "the parties' intentions are determined from the plain meaning of the
contractual language." Benjamin, 2006 UT 37, \ 14. Words must be interpreted as "used
in common, daily, non-technical speech," not a specialized vocabulary. Government
Employees Ins. Co. v. Dennis, 645 P.2d 672, 675 (Utah 1982); see also United States Fid.
& Guar. v. Sandt, 854 P.2d 519, 525 (Utah 1993) (refusing to read policy based upon
insurance company's "plausible [meaning] when analyzed by one trained in technical
construction"); Dawson v. Dawson, 841 P.2d 749, 751 (Utah 1992) (meaning must "be
plain to a person of ordinary intelligence and understanding . . . in accordance with the
usual and natural meaning of the words"). Moreover, "this court has a long history of
relying on dictionary definitions to determine plain meaning." State v. Redd, 1999 UT
108, U 11, 992 P.2d 986, 990. In particular, "standard, nonlegal dictionaries may be a
more reliable guide to the construction of an insurance contract then definitions found in
law dictionaries." Dennis, 645 P.2d at 675.
Great American throws this established law aside and argues that dictionaries and
plain meaning should be ignored because no dictionary contains the entire phrase
"temporary employee for the customer." GA Brief at 23. In reality, Great American's
argument is, in essence, an attempt to violate the fundamental rule that all of the words
used must be given effect. Great American simply reads the word "temporary" out of the
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Federal Policy because supposedly "the essence" of the phrase "temporary employee for
the customers" is that "he [is] working for a customer." Id.
This attempt to read the word "temporary" out of the Federal Policy is improper.
See Marriot v. Pacific Nat. Life Assur. Co., 467 P.2d 981, 983 (Utah 1970) ("we . ..
assume that language included [in an insurance policy] was put there for a purpose");
Vitagraph, Inc. v. American Theatre Co., 291 P. 303, 306 (Utah 1930) ("no word should
be rejected as mere surplusage if the court can discover any reasonable purpose thereof).
In addition, Great American cannot argue that the word "temporary" is anything but plain
and unambiguous. It means "lasting or effective for a time only." R 1073-75 (Random
House Webster's College Dictionary (2nd ed. Revised 2000)). As applied to an employee,
it means "an office worker hired . . . for a short period of time." Id. Nor does Great
American explain how it can read the word "temporary" out of the Federal Policy, when
that same policy defines the very similar phrase "temporary workers" in a temporal way
and such definition makes a difference for coverage. See R 662-63 (ff E, H, N).
Great American's reading of the word "staff is equally uncompelling. Again,
Great American asks this Court to ignore plain meaning and the dictionary definition of
"staff as "a group of people, especially employees, who carry out the work of an
establishment or perform a specific function." R 1074. Instead, Great American
mischaracterizes the position of Peters by claiming that he reads the Federal Policy so that
all "temporary employees" are "staff and all temporary employees are covered. See GA
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Brief at 19, 23, 27-28. As noted above, many, if not most, "employees" of SOS are not
"staff because they are "temporary employees" who are "hired . . . for a short period of
time." R 1073-75 (dictionary).
In considering the meaning of "staff," this Court should also consider Great
American's discussion of SOS's website. See GA Brief at 30. Great American, with
desperation, argues that SOS's website is not "part of the record" (id.), although that claim
is untrue. See R 1081-85.8 The website shows that SOS publicly refers to the workers it
provides to its customers as "staff to meet the customers "staffing" needs. Id. Great
American counters that "[t]he website speaks of placing a temporary employee with a
customer." GA Brief at 30. In reality, the reference to "temporaries" is only to the fact
that SOS changed its name from "SOS Temporary Services to SOS Staffing Services,
Inc.-a name that would better reflect their changing name and broader scope of
services." R 1084 (emphasis added). This broader scope of service includes
"infomiation technology and specialty niches" (R 1094) and "temporary, temp-to-hire and
permanent placement" (R 1082 (emphasis added)). SOS undeniably does not limit its
use of the word "staff to refer to office personnel. In fact, it changed the company's
name from "Temporary Services" to "Staffing Services" precisely because SOS supplies
both short-term ("temporary") and long-term ("permanent") employees to clients. At a

8

The website was presented to the trial court on December 15, 2003. Id. Despite
several subsequent filings and oral argument, Great American has never taken issue with
the genuineness of the website. See R 1294-1322, 1707-37, R 1855.
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minimum, the word "staff is "a 'slippery' word to mark out and designate those who are
insured by the policy [and] . . . [a]ll who may, by any reasonable construction of the word,
be included . . . should be given [the policy's] protection." Dennis, 645 P.2d at 675.
Great American also conspicuously fails to address this Court's guidance that
contracts are to be read consistently with the "actions of the parties in proceeding under
the contract." Peterson v. Sunrider Corp., 2002 UT 43, \ 23, 48 P.3d 918, 920; see also
Restatement (Second) Contracts § 202(4), cmt g ("The parties to an agreement know best
what they meant, and their action under it is often the strongest evidence of their
meaning."). Great American instead attacks Federal, Peters and their lawyers by
describing Federal's finding of coverage as "concocted and pointless." GA Brief at 40. In
truth, Federal found coverage before coverage counsel was retained and despite Great
American's attempts to interfere. As the drafter of endorsement 16-02-33 {see Appellants'
Brief at 11, SOF f 25), Federal's coverage finding is "the strongest evidence" of meaning.
Restatement (Second) Contracts § 202(4), cmt g.
SOS's actions are likewise supportive of coverage. SOS's post-claim assertions of
intent made in the context of concerns over future insurance rates are irrelevant and
directly at odds with SOS's contemporaneous efforts to seek secondary automobile
liability insurance for its employees supervised by clients including "payrollers." SOF at
13 (ffl[ 35-36). SOS also represented and warranted automobile coverage for clients and
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involved employees under the same policy language relied upon here, including full-time
programmers sent to work for H.P. See supra 5-6.
Great American's actions are also consistent with coverage. Great American tries
to sweep aside the admissions of its adjustor and coverage counsel, citing cases outside of
Utah. See GA Brief at 31. Great American fails to distinguish the cited Utah authority.
See Appellants' Brief at 45, n.17. Great American simply does not own up to the fact that
its adjustor and legal counsel concluded after studied review that the only issues under the
Federal Policy were whether Peters was on a temporary short-term assignment and
whether he was acting to benefit SOS. See R 635-42, 753-58. These agents did not
contend, as Great American now argues, that the word "temporary" can be read out of the
Federal Policy. See GA Brief at 19-20.
In short, the Federal Policy covers Peters because he was an SOS employee who
was not a "temporary employee" for a customer.
IV.

AMBIGUITY IN ENDORSEMENT 16-02-33 MANDATES A FINDING OF
COVERAGE.
If this Court does not find that the Federal Policy unambiguously covers Peters,

coverage is still available because in Utah, "ambiguous or uncertain language in an
insurance contract that is fairly susceptible to different interpretations should be construed
in favor of coverage." Sandt, 854 P.2d at 522. At a minimum, the reading of 16-02-33
offered by Federal and Peters is one reasonable interpretation.
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Great American seeks to override the established principle of construing ambiguity
against the insurer by citing Jaramillo v. Providence Washington Ins. Co., 871 P.2d 1343,
1347 (N.M. 1994) and arguing that Peters is a "third party" stranger to the Federal Policy.
See GA Brief at 27-28. Jaramillo does not support Great American because the policy in
that case covered only one class of insureds--"you"--defmed as a corporate entity. Here,
the Federal Policy defines the covered insureds to include SOS's "employees." See SOF
at 6flffl6-7). Where a class of insureds is identified, the plaintiff "need not be personally
named in the contract" in order to recover just as any other insured. See Tradesmen Int'l
v. United States Postal Serv., 234 F. Supp. 2d 1191, 1202 (D. Kan. 2002); see also United
States v. United Services Auto. Ass'n, 968 F.2d 1000, 1002-1003 (10th Cir. 1992)
(ambiguous language covers persons other than named insured). The Federal Policy
mandates this result: "the coverage afforded applies separately to each insured who is
seeking coverage or against whom a . . . 'suit1 is brought." R 662 (f F).
In Dennis, 645 P.2d at 674, this Court dealt with a virtually identical issue and
found that the rule requiring that ambiguities be construed against the insurer applies to
an "insured" whose status arises by description rather than by name. Id. (finding the word
"resident" to be ambiguous). Similarly, in IDS Hosp. v. Capitol Life Ins. Co., 765 P.2d
857 (Utah 1988), the "insured" was the husband of the named insured and this Court did
not hesitate to apply the "long subscribed to . . . view that any ambiguity or uncertainty in
the language of an insurance policy must be resolved in favor of coverage." Id. at 858. In
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light of these cases and the language of the Federal Policy, it is clear Peters is an
"insured" equal to SOS.
In trying to avoid the impact of an ambiguity, Great American also cites Pekin Ins.
Co. v. Benson, 714 N.E.2d 559, 563 (111. Ct. App. 1999) for the proposition that the
phrase "and not temporary employees for the customers" merely illustrates who the "staff
does not include, rather than serving to define who is not covered. See GA Brief at 26,
n.7. In Pekin, however, the illustration was in a separate sentence and the word used was
"includes," which is far more illustrative than the words "and not." Id. at 565. Moreover,
the holding in Pekin is that because the word "includes" could also be read to be a phrase
of limitation (i.e., a definition), the policy had to be read to favor the broadest possible
coverage. Id. Here, the phrase "staff of the insured only and not temporary employees
for the customers" is most naturally read to define the excluded "non-staff as the
"temporary employees for the customers." Because this reading is supportive of
coverage, it must be followed. Sandt, 854 P.2d at 522-23.
In addition, the word "staff is not limiting. "Staff is commonly defined as a
synonym for "employee." R 941-42 (Addendum Ex. I); R 1074 (Addendum Ex. H). SOS
itself refers to the people it sends to its clients as "staff who solve "staffing" problems
and provide "staffing solutions." R 1081-84. Even more importantly, Federal reasonably
read the language of 16-02-33 to provide coverage and it paid its $1,000,000 limit. As
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detailed above, SOS's and Great American's actions likewise demonstrate that Peters has
presented a "reasonable" reading of the Federal Policy.
Moreover, if Great American were correct that Federal and SOS agreed to exclude
all "employees who were directly responsible for customers at their place of work" (GA
Brief at 19-20), that intent could have been easily expressed. Instead, Federal and SOS
chose the words "temporary employees" at a time when SOS knew it would continue to
field demands from H.P. and other clients for "permanent" employee insurance. Great
American now seeks to ignore the word "temporary," while Peters gives effect to the
word and therefore his interpretation, joined by Federal, is clearly reasonable.
V.

GREAT AMERICAN IS BOUND BY FEDERAL'S PROVISION OF
COVERAGE.
Although Great American tries to avoid the words "follow form," it is undeniable

that Great American's position is that its policy "follows" Federal endorsements CA 989
and 16-02-33. See GA Brief at 2, 34. In taking a coverage position contrary to Federal's,
it is important to note that Great American had no involvement in drafting the Federal
Policy and there were no communications with Great American. See SOF at 9 (f 19).
Consequently, the law is clear that as a follow form carrier, Great American must
pay according to Federal's interpretation, especially where it had no involvement in
drafting. See Playtex FP, Inc. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 609 A.2d 1087, 1093 (Del. 1991)
(follow form carriers are held to the interpretation of the primary insurer); Associated
Indem. Corp. v. Dow Chemical Co., 814 F. Supp. 613, 618 (E.D. Mich. 1993) (consistent
24

interpretation is necessary). Great American weakly attempts to distinguish these cases as
not involving policy "construction." See GA Brief at 42. To the contrary, in Playtex, the
court extensively analyzed the primary insurance and held that the excess carrier was
bound by the construction of the primary insurer. 609 A.2d at 1092-98. Similarly, in
Associated Indem., 814 F. Supp. at 618, the court construed and applied the terms of the
primary policy, precisely because the policies followed form. See also Appellants' Brief
at 49 (citing additional cases).
Incredibly, Great American tries to avoid these cases by arguing that its policy
does not follow form in all respects. See GA Brief at 41-42. However, Great American's
own argument is "follow form" for 16-02-33. Consequently, Federal's interpretation of
16-02-33 controls. Great American fails to cite a single contrary authority.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's grant of summary judgment must be reversed and Peters declared
an "insured" based upon the four independent grounds described in Sections II-IV.
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